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Many producers use leasing of agricultural land as a management strategy to conserve 
limited capital, expand their operation, or to reduce risk.  The contractual form of land 
leases can vary depending on the type of crop, prevailing technology, market structure, 
and other characteristics of the social and economic environment (Eswaran and Kotwal, 
1985).  The USDA reported that 41% of U.S. farmland was operated under lease 
agreements in 1997 compared to 35% in 1950 (Hoppe and Wiebe, 2002).   
Analysis of agricultural land lease arrangements has been a focus of economists 
since the early writings of Adam Smith and John Stewart Mill (Dasgupta et al., 1999).  
However, substantive empirical analysis on agricultural lease contracts represents a much 
younger and smaller literature (Allen and Lueck, 1992; Dasgupta et al., 1999).   
The objective of this article is to model the incentive effects of the division of 
labor between landlord and tenant for production under limited-duration land lease 
contracts.  The model provides an intuitive result:  landlords will be responsible for 
provision of durable and landholding specific inputs, whereas tenants will tend to be 
responsible for inputs whose productivity is fleeting.  Implications of the model as 
applied to specific production settings are then empirically tested using data from 
Oklahoma statewide farmland leasing surveys conducted in 1998 and 2000.   There are 
many studies done on the reasons for the existence of various contractual forms (Alston 
and Higgs, 1982; Janssen et al., 2002; Otsuka and Hayami, 1988; Stiglitz, 1974).   
However, whatever the contract type, lease agreements and negotiations involve 
assignments of responsibilities to supply relevant inputs and tasks to the contracting 
parties of landlord and tenant.  To our knowledge, little or no empirical work has focused 
on the division of labor and responsibility for input provision in agricultural land 
contracts.   
                                                           
* The authors are (respectively), Postdoctoral fellow, Centre for Health Economics Research and 
Evaluation, University of Technology, Sydney, AU; Assistant Professor, Department of Agricultural and 
Resource Economics, Washington State University, Professor, Department of Agricultural Economics, 
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  1  Some empirical studies have found that landlords expect tenant moral hazard.  
Kauffman (1993) finds that southern landlords were willing to pay extra to buy mules 
because they were a type of physical capital which could stand potential neglect and 
abuse from the tenants.  Moral hazard can also take form as a mistiming in transplanting 
or a wrong fertilizer mix application, which can have negative consequences in future 
land productivity (Eswaran and Kotwal, 1985).  It is also possible for the tenant to under-
invest in inputs that have productive benefits beyond the lease term.  The theoretical 
literature has shown that farmland owners usually have strong incentives to conserve soil 
as a means of protecting the land value over the long run, whereas tenants are concerned 
with investments in maintaining productivity only over the expected life of the contract 
(Lichtenberg, 2001).  The landlord may also refrain from applying the long-term optimal 
level of an input, when the productivity of that input is solely for the lease term.  This 
kind of behavior on the part of both parties is a phenomenon not yet fully explored in the 
literature (Eswaran and Kotwal, 1985).  
 
Effects of moral hazard on the division of labor 
In an arrangement in which costs, benefits, and resource allocation decisions are 
shared among two or more parties, resources may not be efficiently allocated if the 
contract does not assign expected net present value of benefits in the same proportion as 
the expected net present value of costs.  The incentive to shirk on contracted input 
responsibilities result when full observation and monitoring of actions are either 
impossible or prohibitively costly (Holmstrom, 1979).  Asymmetric information between 
contracting agents, output uncertainty and existence of many absentee landlords, each can 
play a role in monitoring problem.  For example, in a grazing lease contract between a 
landlord (pasture owner) and a cattle owner, if the landlord is responsible for checking 
cattle, the cattle owner cannot costlessly or perfectly detect landlord effort.  Although the 
cattle owner can make some inferences about the landlord’s effort from the status of the 
property at any given moment, this imperfect signal is not enough to induce fully 
efficient landlord effort. 
A model of the distribution of benefits and the incentives of landowners and 
lessees is developed in this section.  The incentives and welfare effects of shirking by 
both tenant and landlord are examined.  The model encompasses both crop-share and 
cash-rent contracts, which affects the implications of the model.  The landlord and tenant 
are assumed to be identical except for their position in the contract:  they have identical 
productive capacity for any given input, each is assumed to have the same (fixed) 
marginal opportunity cost for any given input, both landlord and tenant are assumed to be 
risk neutral.
1  These assumptions are maintained to emphasize the impact of contract 
duration and input durability on the incentives of tenant and landlord. 
Assume that the value of production during the contract period and the post-
contract period is stochastic, and that the objective is to maximize the net expected 
                                                           
1 Reliance on relative risk aversion is dubious at best in this type of setting.  As pointed out by Allen and 
Lueck 1992, it is common for landowners to lease land elsewhere, making individuals both landlords and 
tenants simultaneously.  This requires differences among individuals.  Our approach requires differences 
only in the position of an individual as a party in a specific contract. 
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•  x is a composite input applied during the lease period that includes both quantity 
and quality. 
•  V1 is the net returns to land during the lease period; V2 is the net present value of 
returns to land after the end of the lease period, both of which are affected by the 
level of the variable input x. 
•  so  is the tenant’s share of first-period output V1, (1-so) is the landlord’s share of 
V1,  
•  d is the proportion of the applied input that remains after the end of the lease 
period  
•  w is the exogenously determined per unit opportunity cost of the input.   
  The range of the depreciation variable d is 0 ≤ d  ≤ 1.  A value  d= 0 means the 
applied input is fully used in the contract period and no productivity is left from that input 
after the contract period ends.  For example, all the benefits from using a mineral 
supplement for livestock in a pasture-grazing lease will be captured during the lease 
period.  Hence, livestock mineral supplement has d= 0.   A value of d > 0 means that the 
proportion d of the applied input carries over to the period after the lease ends.  When 
fencing materials are used in the field during the lease period, some portion of those will 
be used during the lease period, but some of the productivity from a permanent fence may 
remain after the lease terminates.  Therefore, for a one year lease, the d for permanent 
fencing materials may be greater than zero.   
  The value of so depends on the form of the contract agreement.  The range is 
.  If s 0 0 s <≤ 1 o = 0, then it can not be considered a lease contract between a landlord and 
a tenant; it may be that a laborer is hired (fixed-wage) by the decision making farmer to 
help with farming chores, which is not relevant in this case.  For a cash-rent tenancy 
contract, so will be equal to one.  In a cash-rent contract, the tenant pays a lump-sum fee 
to the landlord for the contract and receives all the value during the contract period.  For a 
crop share tenancy contract: 0 < so < 1.
  
  Assume that the contract is specified at the beginning of the period and is not 
renegotiable at any point, and that although input responsibilities are specified in general 
terms, the exact level of inputs required for any given setting is not specified in the 
contract.  Recall that output is stochastic, so that input provision is not exactly inferable 
from output; also assume that input provision by one party is costly to monitor, so that 
monitoring is incomplete.  These two characteristics, along with the incomplete nature of 
the contract, allow for shirking. 
Given a cash-rent contract, the tenant receives 100 percent of the returns to land 
and inputs during the contract period (the landlord receives nothing but the up-front cash-
  3rent).  After the contract period is over the landlord receives any residual net present 
value of production, the ex-tenant receives nothing more.  For a share contract, the tenant 
and landlord each receives a share of the value of production during the contract period, 
but the landlord retains any residual returns after the contract period.  The consequence of 
this division of the value of output is that tenants and landlords will have different 
incentives for input investment. At this point, we will introduce the possibility of adding 
input cost shares such that the tenant pays si of the total cost of x, the landlord pays (1-
si).
2  Given that the tenant has responsibility for providing the input, the objective 
function for the tenant is: 
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The landlord receives (1-so) of the contract period benefits V1 and all of V2 (after the lease 
period ends) and shares (1-s) portion of the input cost.  The objective function for the 
landlord is: 
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Necessary and sufficient conditions for a maximum are assumed:  1 0 Vx > ∂∂ , 
2 0 Vx ∂∂ > , 
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1 0 Vx ∂∂ < , and 
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2 0 Vx ∂ ∂< .  The first-order conditions for (1), (2) and 
(3) are as follows: 
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Solving (4) will give the first best efficient level of x*.  Whenever the applied input level 
is less or more than x*, the value of the contract (net value of production) will be less 
than efficient.  The scope of the present study is limited to two cases, when si = 1 and si = 
0.   
  If the tenant is responsible for the entire cost of the input (s = 1), he will maximize 
his objective function (2) and apply the level xT* (solving (5)).  At s = 0, xT* is undefined.  
If so = 1 and d = 0, then the objective function of the tenant (2) is same as the overall 
                                                           
2 Heady (1971) showed with a simple one period model that input application can be efficient when the 
input application levels are divided to the relevant parties according to their share in outputs.  However, 
Heady did not consider the inputs that have productive benefits beyond the lease period in the model. 
  4objective function (1).  In this case, x* = xT*.  For other relevant cases, 0 < so < 1 and 0 < 
d≤ 1, the tenant receives only a portion of full benefit and VT< V.  Consequently, the 
tenant will apply less than the efficient input level (xT* < x*) in equating his share of the 
value of the marginal product with the marginal factor cost.  Figure 1 includes a chart to 
illustrate the divergence between a societal efficient level of x and the tenant’s optimal 
level of x when d ≠ 0. 
  If the landlord is responsible for the entire cost of the input (s = 0), he will solve 
(6) and apply xL*.  At si = 1, xL* is undefined.  When d= 1, V1 will be zero and the 
landlord receives all the benefit from the applied input as V2.  Therefore, the landlord will 
apply the efficient level of input, xL* = x*, in that case.  For other cases, the landlord does 
not receive all the benefits (VL < V) and will apply an input level that is less than the 
optimal level.  The choice of whom should bear the responsibility depends on the degree 
of shirking relative to the efficient level, and this depends in part on the magnitude of d.   
 
Some testable hypotheses that emerge from the model include: 
H 1: As the output share to the landlord (1-so) increases, the landlord will more likely 
be responsible for input provision. 
H 2: As the longevity of input productivity d increases, the landlord will more likely 
be responsible for input provision. 
 
In the next section, we test these hypotheses using survey data from grazing leases from 
Oklahoma. 
 
Data and specific hypotheses 
  Data were obtained from the Oklahoma statewide farmland leasing surveys 
conducted in December of 1998 and 2000 (Doye et al., 1999; Doye et al., 2001).   
Questionnaires were mailed to individuals involved in farming in Oklahoma.   
Approximately 624 surveys from 1998 and 528 surveys from 2000 were returned with 
useable data.  Each questionnaire includes a section that focuses on wheat pasture grazing 
leases, and another section that focuses on other pasture leases.  Each observation in the 
dataset created from the survey responses represents a single lease contract between a 
tenant and a landlord for a grazing lease in which the tenant is the livestock owner and 
the landlord is the pasture owner.  The data used on the analysis below include 
information on 
•  the type of payment (cash rent or share),  
•  the type of respondent (tenant or landlord),  
•  the duration of the contract (annual or multi-year),  
•  the form of the contract (oral or written).   
With regard to the type of payment, respondents were asked to identify rental price 
method based on a set of alternatives.  If the rental price method was $/acre/year or 
$/acre/month or $/head/month, the contract was classified as a cash rent contract 
because it is based on input usage, not output useage.  If the method was $/lb of gain, 
  5the contract was considered a share contract.  In this case the output (cattle gains) 
affects the revenue of both the tenant (livestock owner) and landlord (pasture owner).   
A list of specific tasks is also provided on the questionnaire, and the respondent 
was asked to specify whether the landlord, the tenant, or both were responsible for 
each of the tasks listed.   This analysis focuses on input durability in relation to 
contract duration, so of the inputs listed, we focus on those inputs that are either 
clearly durable and fixed (with benefits from investment may extend beyond the 
contract and accrue to the landlord), or are fleeting (accrue during the contract to the 
current tenant).  The input data we use relate to 
•  fencing materials 
•  fencing labor  
•  checking livestock. 
•  supplemental feeding and/or pasture 
We hypothesize that of all inputs, fencing materials are most durable (large d).  
Fencing labor often must be applied in a timely manner, and the benefits of 
timeliness will generally accrue to the current tenant, so d is smaller.  Checking 
livestock is  hypothesized to be mostly of benefit to the current tenant, and again, 
timeliness is likely to be important.  Supplemental feeding is a bit more complex.  
Benefits surely accrue to the tenant, because it will help the livestock in terms of 
weight gain.  However, supplemental feed also may benefit the landlord to the extent 
that it reduces overgrazing in worse-than-expected forage conditions, because long-
term forage productivity can be diminished on rangeland as a consequence of 
overgrazing (Ellison, 1960).  The type of pasture matters, however.  In particular, 
excessive pressure on perennial grasses may have substantial long-term impacts, but 
it may have little or no long-term effects on annual wheat.
3  Although a number of 
different pasture types were included in the survey, we focus on native pasture 
(perennial) and winter wheat pasture for this analysis. 
Hypothesis 1 presented in the previous section applies to any input (landlord more 
likely to provide inputs if landlord share increases), and this hypothesis will be 
applied to fencing materials and labor and supplemental feed. Given the data 
described above, we are able to test a set of specific corollaries to hypotheses 1 and 2.   
In particular, we test the following hypotheses: 
  
H 1.1: Landlords will more often be responsible for fencing materials under a share 
contract than a cash rent contract. 
H 1.2: Landlords will more often be responsible for fencing labor under a share 
contract than a cash rent contract. 
H 2.1:  Landlords will more often be responsible for fencing materials than fencing 
labor. 
                                                           
3 The pasture owner could conceivably be affected by the impact of overgrazing on wheat yield.  However, 
evidence suggests that grazing wheat has little impact on wheat yield as long as the cattle are removed 
before a specific point in the wheat maturation process known as first-jointing (Epplin, Hossain, and 
Krenzer 2000).    
  6H 2.2: Landlords will more often be responsible for fencing materials than for 
checking livestock. 
H 2.3: Landlords will more often provide supplemental feed and/or pasture for a 
native pasture contract than for a wheat pasture contract. 
It is worth reiterating that tests for hypotheses H 2.* are in principle a joint test of two 
hypotheses: (a) that contacts account for moral hazard due to limited-duration contracts, 
and that the two inputs in question have durability characteristics as hypothesized. 
Hypothesis tests 
We employ two types of tests for the hypotheses listed above.  We begin with 
simple tests for differences in input responsibilities based on differences in output shares 
(hypotheses 1.i) and input durability rates (hypotheses 2.i).  We then extend the test to 
logistic regressions to control for other factors that might affect the probability of one 
outcome or another.  From a theoretical perspective, we implicitly employ a random 
utility model framework in that as researchers we do not fully capture the variation in 
contract value as a function of input decisions, but that difference in expected values of 
contract specification will lead to different distributions of input responsibilities.  Based 
on this framework, if a significantly higher proportion of landlords (rather than tenants) 
provide an input under condition A as compared to condition B, it is because the value of 
contracts tends to favor these outcomes.  
For the means test,  if group i has a binomial distribution with sample size ni+, 
then the sample proportion is  ii i p nn + = .  The standard error of p1 is computed as   
() () 1 ii i se p p p n + =−
()
i .   Assuming the two groups represent independent binomial 
samples, their difference is   diff = p1–p2,  for which the standard error  is 
() 1 se( ) var var diff p p =+ 2 .  Using the normal approximation to the binomial 
distribution, the test statistic is calculated as  ( ) se zd i f f d i f f = , where z has a standard 
normal distribution.  If the p-value is less than the chosen critical value, the null 
hypothesis of diff = 0 is rejected (Agresti, 1990).  See Greene (2003, pp. 670-672) for a 
discussion of logistic regression. The FREQ  and LOGISTIC procedures in SAS were 
used (SAS Institute, 1999). 
For the means tests, only observations for annual agreements were used.   
Empirical evidence in the United States indicates that landlords and tenants are more 
likely to cooperate in sharing information in contracts negotiated for several years, 
whereas less information is shared in single-year contracts (Dasgupta et al., 1999).  Oral 
contracts suggest that there may be a substantial amount of trust prevailing between 
landlords and tenants, perhaps a result of long-term acquaintances, and a long-term 
relationship between tenant and landlord will likely improve incentives even for a short-
term contract.  To the extent that an oral contract is an indicator that the tenant and 
landlord have a long-term relationship, there may be less of a chance of substantial 
shirking in their actions when the contract is oral. Therefore, the means tests are based on 
annual contracts only.  The logistic regression provides a means of seeing the differences 
between these types of contracts with respect to input responsibilities. 
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Results 
The results of the means tests and logistic regressions for the effects of output share are 
discussed first, followed by the results for input durability type. 
Effects of output share type on input responsibilities 
Landlords (pasture owners) were responsible for fencing materials in 53% of share 
contracts and 44% of cash rent contracts.  Similarly, they were responsible for fencing 
labor 50% and 36% of share and cash rent contracts respectively (Table 1).  As 
hypothesized (H 1.1, H1.2), landlords (pasture owners) were responsible for both inputs 
more often in share contracts compared to cash rent contracts.  The differences of 
proportions were significant at the 5% level of confidence in the case of fencing labor 
and at the 10% level of confidence in the case of fencing materials.  The differences of 
proportions also had the correct sign in the other two groups.  However, the differences 
were significant at the 5% level in the “wheat pasture only” group, but only the difference 
for fencing labor was significant at the 10% level in the “native grassland only” group. 
Inputs with different durability rates  
  Consider fencing materials and fencing labor. Materials have a higher d compared 
to that of labor.  It may be beneficial for the landlords to have good quality materials with 
better longevity.  This will increase the land attributes with respect to future leasing 
activities.  Alternatively, fencing labor will mainly include maintaining and fixing the 
fences, which would clearly benefit more during the contract period.  Using all the 
observations, it was found that landlords (pasture owners) provided fencing materials 
43% of the time and fencing labor 37% of the time (Table 2).  The difference was 
significant at the 5% level of confidence and consistent with the implied hypothesis.  The 
difference also had the same correct sign in two other groups- “native grassland only” 
and “wheat pasture only”.     
  Fencing materials clearly have a higher d than the checking livestock activity.  
Fencing materials have productive benefits beyond the lease period, whereas the benefits 
of checking livestock accrue solely during the lease period.  Under the cash rent contract, 
landlords do not have a direct vested interest in the livestock’s overall well being.  The 
results supported the hypothesis; landlords were responsible for fencing materials more 
often than for checking livestock (Table 2).  The differences of proportions were 
significant at the 5% level of confidence in all three groups. 
  Declining ecological condition on rangeland and pasture is a common 
consequence of overgrazing (Ellison, 1960).  Native grassland in particular may suffer 
serious long-term negative effects in terms of the land’s reproductive capacity due to 
overgrazing, whereas overgrazing is not a big problem on winter wheat pasture.   
Providing supplemental feed is one of the decision variables management can use to 
control overgrazing problems on native grassland.  Good supplemental feeding and 
pasture activities in the case of native grassland help to limit the exploitation of forage 
resource for short-term profitability and preserve long-term soil and vegetation resource.   
From this point of view, it can be said that supplemental feed and supplemental pasture 
  8have a higher d in native grassland leases than in winter wheat pasture leases.  The 
landlords with the intention of maintaining long-term pasture productivity on grazing 
land will more often be responsible for supplemental feed and supplemental pasture for 
native grassland than for wheat pasture leases.  Results in Table 3 were consistent with 
this hypothesis.  However, the difference of proportions was significant for supplemental 




Logistic regressions were applied to model the probability that the landlord was 
responsible for supplemental feed (table 4) and for fencing materials (table 5), and 
fencing labor (table 6).  Included in these regressions is a variable other inputs, that 
represents the proportion of other inputs that were provided by the landlord --- inputs 
other than the dependent variable.  This variable is included as a proxy to capture general 
factors that affect the agreed-upon responsibility set.  For example, how far the land is 
from the home of both the tenant and the landlord will affect the relative costs of input 
provision to the extent that it requires a trip to the pasture.  This may affect the propensity 
of one or the other agent to provide all or none of the inputs.  The variables written, 
annual, and cash rent are dummy variables taking the value one if the contract was 
written, if it was an annual contract, and if it was a cash rent rather than share contract, 
respectively. 
  One additional explanatory variable was included in the regression on 
supplementary feed.    This is the dummy variable wheat pasture, which takes the value 
one if the contract relates to wheat pasture grazing.  Based on hypothesis H 2.1, landlords 
are more likely to provide supplemental feed for perennial native pasture than for annual 
wheat pasture.  Consistent with hypothesis H 2.1, wheat pasture is negative and strongly 
significant; landlords are indeed more inclined to provide supplemental feed where 
overgrazing is more likely to have long-lasting effects. 
It is useful to consider together the fencing material and fencing labor regressions 
(tables 5 and 6).  Landlords are statistically more likely to provide fencing materials and 
labor for share contracts than for cash-rent contracts.  These results are consistent with 
hypotheses H 1.1 and H 1.2.  However, landlords are more likely to provide fencing 
materials under annual contacts but not statistically more likely to provide fencing labor.  
These results are consistent with the notion embodied in hypothesis H2.1 and H2.2, that 
the benefits of quality materials beyond the contract period outweigh the benefits within 
the contract period, whereas timely labor has important consequences in the short term 
that outweigh long-term benefit.   
Summary and Conclusions 
Delegation of inputs and management responsibilities to the contracting parties is an 
important aspect of contract design that has received little attention in the large literature 
on agricultural land lease contracts.  Since benefits from agricultural inputs may extend 
beyond the contractual period and since a privately optimal decision on the part of one 
  9party may not result in an efficient resource allocation leases may suffer from moral 
hazard.   
When actions cannot be directly monitored because of high cost and output 
uncertainty, and input responsibilities are non-divisible, economic theory suggests that 
assignments of responsibilities need to take into account the possibility of moral hazard, 
and an important method to control moral hazard and increase efficiency is to assign 
input responsibilities in ways that will induce proper input use incentives.   
The empirical results, based on simple means tests and logistic regression, are 
generally consistent with the hypotheses that follow from the theory.  Landlords tend to 
take responsibility for inputs that have long-term consequences, and tenants tend to have 
responsibility for inputs that have short-term consequences.  If there were no uncertainty, 
if contracts were perfectly specified, and monitoring were costless and perfect, then input 
assignment would not matter. 
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  12Table 1.  Fencing provided by the landlord (pasture owner) in annual share 
versus annual rent contract (proportions).  Predicted difference (p1-









p1- p2  P-value  Sample 
Size 
Fencing          
Native Grassland only           
Fencing Materials  0.52  0.41  0.11  0.155  243 
Fencing Labor  0.48  0.33    0.15*  0.085  252 
Wheat Pasture only           
Fencing Materials  0.56  0.39  0.17**  0.048  94 
Fencing Labor  0.55  0.32  0.23**  0.01  94 
All          
Fencing Materials  0.53  0.44  0.09*  0.064  525 
Fencing Labor  0.50  0.36    0.14**  0.009  535 
 
** Significant at the 0.05 probability level. 
  * Significant at the 0.10 probability level.   
 
  13Table 2.  Inputs responsibilities provided by the landlord (pasture owner) in 
annual cash rent.   Proportions of durable inputs and nondurable 
inputs provided by pasture owner are p1 and p2, respectively.   















    
Native Grassland only  0.41 0.34  0.07*  0.068  434 
Wheat Pasture only  0.40 0.31  0.09 0.189  90 





    
Native Grassland only  0.40 0.31  0.09**  0.018  440 
Wheat Pasture only  0.40 0.16  0.24**  0.008  86 
All  0.44 0.33  0.11**  0.0009  874 
          
 
** Significant at the 0.05 probability level. 
  * Significant at the 0.10 probability level.   
 
 
Table 3.  Proportions of supplemental feeding and supplemental pasture done 
by the landlord (pasture owner) in native grassland versus in wheat 














Supplemental Feed  0.30  0.15  0.15**  0.013  291 
Supplemental Pasture  0.30  0.26  0.04  0.32  259 
 
** Significant at the 0.05 probability level. 
Significant at the 0.10 probability level.   
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Table  4.  Logistic regression.  Response Variable=1 if supplemental feed 






Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq
Intercept -6.97  1.43  23.83 <.0001 
Other inputs  1.91  0.25  57.83  <.0001 
Written -0.15  0.67  0.05 0.8240 











Likelihood Ratio  (5 df) = 631.02, P<0.0001 
Percent Concordant=99.4 
 
Table 5.   Response Variable=1 if fencing materials provided by pasture owner; 
zero otherwise (N=536). 
N=536 param.  std.  Err.  Chi-sq. P-value
Intercept -1.29  0.32  15.80  <.0001 
other inputs  0.37  0.03  127.50  <.0001 
Written -0.15  0.25  0.35  0.5551 
Annual 0.50  0.24  4.43  0.0352 
Cash rent  -0.91  0.27  11.11  0.0009 
 




Table 6.  Dependent variable = 1 if fencing labor provided by pasture owner, 0 
otherwise. 
N=536 param.  std.  Err.  Chi-sq. P-value
Intercept -3.04  0.58  27.16  <.0001 
other inputs  1.03  0.08  154.37  <.0001 
Written -0.16  0.44  0.12  0.7247 
Annual 0.31  0.44  0.51  0.4764 
Cash rent  -1.34  0.44  9.19  0.0024 
Likelihood Ratio (4 df)= 509.49; P<.0001 
Percent Concordant=97.5
  15 
 xT*  x* X 








w (Per unit opportunity 
 cost of input) 
  s  (Value of Marginal product to tenant)  
 
















Figure 1.  Application of input by tenant compared to the efficient level   







Figure 2. Value of production under three scenarios as a function of the input 
depreciation rate and limited-duration contract: Efficient input allocation, input use given 
tenant responsibility, and input use given tenant responsibility.  Contract value is higher 
  16under tenant responsibility for d<0.55, and optimal division of labor is for the tenant to 
provide input when d is greater than 0.55.  




  Figure 2 is based on a specific model with a simple Cobb-Douglas production 
function, with input depreciation and discounting.  The specific functional forms for 
equations (1), (2) and (3) are (respectively) 
(7)    ( ) [(1 ) ] (1 )[(1 ) ] ( ) Eo o Vx    s - d x   - s  - d x   d x w x
ββ ρ =+ +
(8)  () [ ( 1 )] To i Vx    s - d x  s w x
β =−  
(9)  ( ) ( ) (1 )[(1 ) ] ( ) 1 Lo i Vx    - s - d x     d x sw x
ββ ρ =+ − −  
The parameters used to generate figure 2 are w=1, β=0.5, and the discount rate is ρ=0.9. 
A cash-rent contract is assumed, so so=0.  Solving for optimal levels of 
*
E x , 
*
T x , and 
*
L x  
from the respective first order conditions, yields derived input demands of 
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